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TERRORISM: AN ALGERIAN PERSPECTIVE1
Ambassador Idriss Jazairy2
Excellence, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am most indebted to you
all for giving me the opportunity to share with you my remarks on
"Terrorism: An Algerian Perspective."
My purpose will be the following: first, to demonstrate that the
outbreak of terrorism in Algeria preceded and was not the consequence
of the interruption of the Parliamentary Elections of 1992. Second, to
point to Algeria's pioneering role in promoting a collective response to
this major challenge by the Arab region, the African continent, and the
international community at large. Third, to attempt to challenge some
stereotypes which have obscured this whole debate both concerning
the issue of terrorism in general and those pertaining to Algeria in
particular.
I. OUTBREAK OF TERRORISM IN ALGERIA
First, I am claiming that terrorist violence in Algeria did not
result from the interruption of the parliamentary elections "the FIS"
(the civilian arm of the terrorism movement) "was set to win," -
which has been the stereotyped media explanation in the West ever
since.
Terrorism has a long history, which harks back to the early
eighties. There had indeed been an under-current of Islamic extrem-
ism in Algeria dating back to 1964, which was linked to the Islamic
Brotherhood in Egypt. Nevertheless, Algerians woke up in a state of
shock on August 27, 1985, when Mustapha Bouyali, heading an Armed
Islamic Algerian Movement (MIA) attacked a police school in Soumaa -
Blinda. He killed a police man and looted the weapons and ammuni-
tions. His group then murdered four other members of the para-mih-
tary police corps two months later. This was also a time when a so-
called "charity," "Daoua Oua El-Irchad" meaning "Proselytism and
Guidance," came to light. It started recruiting young, usually unem-
ployed Algerians. They were sent to train in military camps in Pe-
shawar, Pakistan, and then joined the Jihad against the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan.
1 This address was given during the Richmond Journal of Global Law and
Business's symposium, Terrorism and American Business: At Home and Abroad,
on October 24, 2003.
2 Ambassador of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the United States
of America.
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On October 5, 1988, as a result of an ossified political structure,
youthful unrest broke out in violent demonstrations in Algiers, which
resulted in civilian casualties. An Islamic Radical Movement, the FIS,
took advantage of the resulting public indignation. It propelled itself
to the forefront of public life. The FIS was successful and gained con-
trol of most of the municipalities at the following local elections in
June 1990.
This party then started organizing the return of hundreds of
Algerian "Afghans." Its initiative happened to coincide with bin
Laden's policy of redeploying out of Afghanistan his international
force, including some twenty-three hundred (2,300) Algerians, to pur-
sue a kill-to-rule/rule-or-die strategy in the Muslim world. So in
trooped five hundred (500) violent Algerian "Afghan" zealots that were
to become the hard core of the terrorist groups.
With their support the FIS organized an insurrectionary strike
in May 1991, campaigning for civil disobedience. One of its members
murdered a policeman. He was hailed as a hero at a public rally of the
FIS at the Olympic stadium on July 5th that followed. Another one of
these shady Algerian "Afghans" and his accomplices attacked the mili-
tary post of Guemmar at the Tunisian border in November 1991. They
murdered three soldiers, wounded others, and made off with the post's
weapons and ammunitions.
Thus terrorist violence preceded by a large margin the Decem-
ber 1991 parliamentary elections that the FIS entered with the slogan:
"An Islamic State Whether by Ballots or Bullets."
Controlling local authorities, the FIS indulged in the system-
atic falsification of the electoral registers. Before the run-off election,
there was massive protest. Major street demonstrations by civil soci-
ety demanded that an end be put to this masquerade-vote. The Presi-
dent of the Republic resigned and the voting interrupted. In response
to the protests, the Army that had left the political scene in 1988 inter-
vened anew for a time, in the affairs of the State. It did so because the
Republican system was imperiled.
One can distinguish three phases in the recent evolution of ter-
rorism in Algeria: In a first phase, from 1985 onwards, terrorist groups
took selective aim at the security forces, then at the intellectuals, state
officials, foreign nationals and economic infrastructure. The purpose
of this first expansionary phase of the terrorist attacks, until 1994,
was to destabilize the State. In a second phase, the terrorist groups
perpetrated indiscriminate mass civilian killings. That strategy was
pursued until 1997 with the objective of "punishing" civilians for hav-
ing voted at the 1995 presidential elections or for having set up self-
defense groups. Since 1998, we have been witnessing a third phase of
decline of terrorist activities and their redeployment as part of the in-
ternational strategy of al Qaeda. The decline is characterized by a ter-
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rorist resort to planting mines and booby-traps rather than to open
attacks. There are also some ambushes and roadblocks manned by
small and highly mobile groups in remote rural areas.
At present, two main terrorist groups operate in Algeria. The
larger one is the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),
which is estimated to have about two hundred and fifty (250) mem-
bers. It is said to be among the most active of the twenty-seven groups
listed under the aegis of al Qaeda to which its new leadership declared
full allegiance on September 11, 2003. The GSPC is itself split into at
least three conflicting groups. It was initially a splinter group from
the Armed Islamic Group or GIA, which was the new name for the
MIA of the eighties. The GLA now only has about thirty members left.
Both the GSPC and the GIA are listed by the U.S. State Department
as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. There are other splinter groups of
terrorists. In total an estimated six hundred (600) terrorists may still
be on the run.
What drives these terrorists?
A distorted vision of Islam, custom-made to justify the resort to
violence and to obliterate the difference between "good" and "evil."
Their groups seek legitimacy in truncated verses from the Koran.
They invoke, out of context, fundamentalist interpretations of Islam
provided by Ibn Hanbal in the 8th Century and by his follower Ibn
Thaymia in the 13th through 14th Century. Sunni Islam limits the
right of interpretation of the faith to only individuals who are serene,
serious, of high moral standing and who enjoy broad recognition as
theologians. Here., thugs usurped this function to justify murder.
A world-known philosopher Ibn Rochd, known as Averroes in
the West. refers already in the 12th Century in a book called "The
Agreement of Religion and Philosophy" to incompetent people who
venture in the interpretation of Islam. "They broke to pieces the di-
vine law and completely divided the people," he asserts. He goes on to
say: "Their speculations have greatly injured the Muslims thus divided
in sects and killing one another." He could have been referring to con-
temporary terrorists attacking our people.
How come Algeria was the country, which suffered most from
terrorism in its region if not in the world?
The country was fragile, moving from a command economy to
one governed by the market. This transition caused great social turbu-
lence making Algeria appear as the soft under-belly of the
Mediterranean.
Algeria got little or no external sympathy or support for its
fight against terrorism in the nineties. Yet terrorism was defeated by
the combination of three converging forces. Military force of course.
Then people power through participation and involvement. People
often expressed their resistance quietly but resolutely.
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Parents continued to send their kids, and especially their
daughters, to school despite death threats and wholesale destruction
of schools. Teachers returned to teaching and journalists, to writing,
despite widespread assassinations of their colleagues.
Finally there was the thrust of the initiative taken by Presi-
dent Bouteflika to ensure national reconciliation. This was known as
the "Civil Concord" initiative offering lenient terms to terrorists ac-
cepting to lay down their arms. This was adopted by an overwhelming
majority of the Algerian population through a referendum held in Sep-
tember 1999.
II. ALGERIA'S PIONEERING ROLE IN RESPONSE TO
TERRORISM
This brings me to the second part of my presentation relating
to Algeria's contribution to combating the expansion of terrorism at
the regional and at the international levels.
The internal challenges encountered did not deter Algeria from
devoting much effort to promoting awareness at the Arab, African, and
international levels of the dire consequences of terrorism on the civi-
lized world. Not just out of altruism but also because we believed, and
we were proved right, that local and international manifestations of
terrorism are closely interrelated.
Terrorism in spite of the high casualties inflicted on civilians in
Algeria, failed in its bid to gain control of the country. It therefore
increasingly fanned out to other parts of Africa. Illustrative of this
deployment are the massacres of foreign tourists in Luxor, Egypt, in
1997 and the 1998 attacks in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam.
In response to the internationalization of terrorism, Algeria ex-
ercised leadership in the nineties to draw up the Arab and African
Conventions against terrorism. The Arab Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Terrorism was adopted on April 22, 1998, and came into force
on May 7, 1999. As for the OAU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism, it was adopted at the OAU Summit in Algiers
in 1999 and came into force on December 6, 2002.
The Algiers Convention puts special emphasis on the necessity
for African States, when fighting terrorism, to comply with some basic
principles. Those of international humanitarian law and those en-
shrined in Africa's Charter on Human and People's Rights.
This is a reflection of the President of Algeria's commitment to
these principles. He indeed expressed to President Bush, in November
2001, his resolve to pursue simultaneously the fight against terrorism
and promotion of an open democracy respectful of human rights.
Whereupon President Bush exclaimed: "If you succeed, you'll be a
hero!"
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Since the adoption of the Algiers Convention, Algeria has ac-
tively engaged in the preparation of an Action Plan to give operational
content to the Convention. As a sign of solidarity with the United
States of America after September 11, our Government called a high-
level African meeting to adopt the Plan on September 11, 2002. In
recognition of Algeria's leadership in fighting terror, the meeting pro-
posed the creation of an African Centre for Studies and Research on
Terrorism in Algiers, a proposal that was subsequently adopted by the
African Union.
This Convention completed sectoral African conventions
adopted in the nineties to cope with the rise of extremism. They offer a
framework to address the systemic links between terrorism and other
forms of criminality. These include drug trafficking, corruption and
money laundering, as well as trafficking in small arms.
An integrated response of this kind also strengthens Africa's
hand to join with the international community in a true partnership to
provide a global response to what is in effect a global challenge. In-
deed, it was in recognition of the complementary character of regional
and broader international action that Algeria also took an initiative
that led to the adoption by the United Nations in December 1994 of a
Declaration of Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria also expressed his
commitment to the elaboration under United Nations auspices of a
Global Convention to Prevent and Combat Terrorism. Because of his
own bitter experience with terrorism, Algeria's President was one of
the first Heads of State to express sympathy to President Bush after
September 11 and to join the International Coalition to fight this
scourge.
Algeria's support of the United States in fighting terrorism pre-
ceded this woebegone date however. Our security services cooperated
actively with United States law-enforcement agencies after the "Mil-
lennium Scare" in Seattle on the New Year's Day of 2000. This was a
case where Algerian "Afghan" terrorists were involved. In recognition
of our support, President Clinton immediately wrote to his Algerian
counterpart. He suggested the two countries should join forces "to con-
front those who want to harm our citizens and resort to violence to
attack our political systems."
Our bilateral cooperation in this as in other field however took
a spectacular upward turn later on. That was after the two successive
meetings of Presidents Bouteflika and Bush in July and November
2001 (i.e. before as well as after September 11).
Three years down the road, the State Department Coordinator
on Counter-Terrorism recently termed Algeria's contribution as"magnificent."
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III. A CHALLENGE TO CERTAIN STEREOTYPES
And this brings me to the third part of my presentation. It has
to do with the necessity to get rid of stereotypes when discussing ter-
rorism - for these lead to misguided policy prescriptions. There is in
particular a need to narrow differences on the political understanding
of terrorism and its implications regarding the definition of terrorism
in general and the specific situation prevailing in Algeria in particular.
Let me first address the definition of terrorism in general. I
mentioned earlier that Algeria was committed to achieving agreement
on a Global Convention under United Nations auspices to Prevent and
Combat Terrorism. The reason why little progress has been made in
this direction despite conditions that would clearly warrant urgent ac-
tion is a political difference on the definition of terrorism.
There is increasing international awareness of the linkage be-
tween terrorism and organized crime. But there is enhanced opposi-
tion in the West, in the United States particularly in the wake of
September 11, to establishing a distinction between terrorism and
armed resistance of peoples subjected to foreign domination including
colonial occupation.
Thus articles in the January 2002 issue of Atlantic Monthly
and in the Boston Review of February/March 2003 have claimed that
Algeria's war heroes in the fight to recover its independence were
nothing but terrorists. The old film "The Battle of Algiers" describing
part of our liberation epic has now come under attack. Is it not show-
ing, say these critics, Algeria's rebels as heroes when they were but
terrorists? Suffice it for me to refer you to an article I wrote in the
Washington Times under the title "Widening the Rift of Creeds" on
October 11, 2002.
Let me make two remarks: First that France itself has since
recognized that it was waging a war in Algeria and not just maintain-
ing order against terrorists. Second that the President of France dur-
ing his visit to Algeria last month shook hands with the main hero of
the Battle of Algiers, Yacef Saadi, as well as with one of his aides at
the time, Mrs. Zohra Bitat-Drif. They were the main freedom fighters
featuring in the film. The French President recognized them as such,
not as terrorists.
In the same vein, another article by Thomas Di Bacco in the
Washington Times of March 9, 2003, and Michael B. Oren in the New
York Times of March 16, 2003 ("Week in Review") reinterpret the his-
tory of United States-Algerian relations of the early 19th Century. Di
Bacco brands Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, then referred to as
the Barbary States, as "terrorist regimes" of the 18th through 19th
Centuries "sponsored by pirates."
These countries had not at first recognized the United States,
an English colony in their view. That was, until a treaty of mutual
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recognition was signed. Algeria, for one, recognized the United States
by its Treaty of Peace and Amity of September 5, 1795.
The main reason why these Mediterranean States are depicted
as "terrorists" is because, not unlike many European States and in-
deed the Confederate States in America themselves, they were practic-
ing privateering. This targeted the cargo ships of States with which
they were at war or that they did not recognize.
Indeed the port of Baltimore itself thrived on privateering,
which was an internationally recognized practice. This practice was
only banned by the Paris Declaration in 1856. The American ship Ala-
bama was nevertheless being delivered authorizations to privateer by
the Confederate States up to 1860-65 (i.e. after the Paris Declaration).
Yet even in this case nobody calls America a "terrorist regime" spon-
sored by "pirates."
Di Bacco's stereotyping of my country and sub-region is only
one instance of the dual standard applied by some Western media in
their value judgments as they refer to the Arab world rather than their
own societies.
Michael Oren also denounces "Barbary Pirates" as being in a
conflict with Thomas Jefferson analogous to the recent conflict be-
tween President Bush and former President Saddam Hussein. I have
put an end to such a distortion of history in a published letter by the
New York Times on March 24, 2003.
Let me complete this presentation by referring to differences of
perception on Algeria's specific situation and policy to free itself from
the scourge of terrorist violence.
For the most of the decade of the nineties, terrorist attacks on
Algeria were considered in the West as having no international rele-
vance. It was felt in these quarters that the problem could best be
addressed through opening up the political system to Islamic Funda-
mentalists. Yet time has proved that the terrorism, which was
blighted Algeria, is not of a purely internal nature or a mere opposition
to Government through violence. It is a blend of three components: an
ideology vaunted to be a universal panacea - violence and
propaganda.
The ideological panacea in our case was an extremist interpre-
tation of Islam, spearheaded by networks that are themselves transna-
tional as the GSPC has recently proclaimed. The ideology envisions
one Islamic Oumma or Nation spreading from the Atlantic to the Cau-
casus and the Indian Ocean. This area is considered as fair game for
the totalitarian ambitions of its proponents. Their attack is then
dubbed Jihad. Whoever is not with them is against them. Their main
targets are the overwhelming majority of Muslims who do not support
them.
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In this regard, bin Laden and his followers proclaim them-
selves to be the sole interpreters of Divine Law. They have given new
strength to a totalitarian ideology they instilled in the Algerian zealots
sent back to Algeria. This ideology was also disseminated through
their international networks. Such was the case of fatwas of al Qaeda
representatives in London, the likes of Abu Qutada, Abu Doha, and
others. The fatwas provided ideological backing for mass murders car-
ried out in other countries including Algeria.
The criminals issuing fatwas were indeed also given asylum in
England and in other Western countries. After September 11 and
under United States pressure that support is being withdrawn. As a
reaction to the current clampdown, the networks are now resorting to
violence against their Western host countries.
The third component of the terror package, in addition to ideol-
ogy and violence, is propaganda. Propaganda was initially directed to-
ward the people of Algeria. Their dissatisfaction with an outdated
political system might delude them into accepting this offer of a dream
ticket to an idyllic Islamic State. But when killing replaced coaxing, it
became clear to Algerians that what was on offer was a ticket to hell.
Propaganda beamed at the outside world was more durably
successful. The terrorists were attempting to impose through blood-
shed a totalitarian system on a destabilized State in Algeria. Yet they
tried to gain international sympathy by distorting the reality of their
barbaric actions to make it fit into the mould of Western values. They
claimed to be fighting for democracy and against an autocratic regime.
What was going on in Algeria was allegedly not a war waged by a
group of killers against civil society but a "civil war" as if the country
was divided between pro-terrorists and anti-terrorists. The murders
by groups of a maximum of twenty-thousand (20,000) terrorists, at
their zenith in the mid nineties and that are now down to six hundred
(600), targeting through hit-and-run attacks a population of thirty-one
million would no where else be called a "civil war."
The terrorists say in the West that they were only fighting to
rid the country of a "military-backed government." In fact the reality
is the opposite: the military got increasingly involved in state affairs in
1992 to protect the Republic, which was being destabilized by terrorist
attacks. As Chief of Staff General Mohamed Lamari said recently: "In
1992, the Armed forces opened a bracket that was closed in 1999."
That was when President Bouteflika was elected as first civilian head
of state. Yet terrorists propaganda still describe our authorities as a"military-backed government," a description which is echoed compla-
cently in international media.
Be that as it may, how can one justify on-going terrorist activ-
ity by the fact that the democratic process was interrupted in 1992
when that process has since been restored?
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The terrorists in Algeria welcome being referred to by the in-
ternational press as "Islamic militants" or "Armed rebels" thus indi-
rectly decriminalizing terrorism in Algeria. Paradoxically, the same
press would have no hesitation in calling them "terrorists" when they
attack the New York World Trade Center.
The advocates of extremist Islamist movements in Algeria
have been keen on enlisting the support of international human rights
NGOs. This is not to claim that there have been no human rights vio-
lations in Algeria as it was confronted by this acute terrorist challenge.
Nor is it to deny that the political system was in need of accelerated
transformation which terrorism actually hindered. Even when the
United States has been confronted after September 11 to the same
kind of acute challenge, though on a more limited scale, it has been
finding it difficult to reconcile freedom and security in its response.
And Algeria does not have as long a democratic tradition as the United
States.
Most cases of violence in Algeria have been investigated and
many have led to condemnations of the State agents responsible. The
task is not over and investigations are still on-going.
Nevertheless extremist Islamists who have advocated and jus-
tified terrorist violence, clamor that the Government is the villain, fo-
cusing on the issue of the "disappeared." These are defined as people
who have been supposedly arrested by security forces and whose sta-
tus is unknown.
I recently received in Washington a local Algerian NGO called
Somoud, which means "Resistance," that had met with Freedom
House. They were speaking in the name of the families of ten thou-
sand (10,000) or so victims kidnapped by terrorist groups and of the
two thousand (2,000) women raped by these gangs and sent back, dis-
credited into their communities. Paradoxically, few in the interna-
tional humanitarian NGO community seemed interested to hear what
they had to say.
One outstanding propaganda coup of the Algerian terrorist net-
works deserves special mention, as it is a classic example of dis-
information. I am referring to the spin they have given abroad to their
brutal murder of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) Algerians
in twelve years. They were able to turn the tables by getting outside
observers and the media to ask the ludicrous question as to "who was
killing whom." In other words, they attempted to introduce the suspi-
cion in people's mind that maybe the killings were in effect being per-
petrated by the Government's security services working under cover.
Such aberrations are reminiscent of the Internet gibberish af-
ter September 11, claiming that all Jews had been evacuated from the
World Trade Center, pointing the finger at a Zionist conspiracy. A
conspiracy theory involving United States security services in the Pen-
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tagon attack was also developed by a best-seller in France called "The
horrendous deception: No plane crashed on the Pentagon" by Thierry
Meyssan.
These preposterous views were discarded where the United
States were concerned. But they are still vented by the media, despite
the total lack of evidence, where Algeria is concerned, even after Sep-
tember 11. As if terrorism was good for democracy in Algeria but evil
where it threatens Western interests.
I hope that our experience will finally bring home the fact that
this dichotomy between acceptable and unacceptable forms of terror-
ism according to whether it spares or does not spare Western interests
has caused crucial delays in agreeing on an appropriate international
response. This belated response only occurred after many more lives
were unnecessarily lost.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me say that extremism, when instrumentaliz-
ing religion, is particularly dangerous, as its perverted invocation of
God leaves no space for debate. It is not clear what is the nature of the
process that lets faith, which pleads for tolerance, be high jacked by
fundamentalism. Nor can normal people readily understand how the
latter degenerates into extremism and then unpredictably bursts out
into violence. Yet this process has blighted all religions. It has to do
with hubris, self-righteousness, a sense that one can appropriate God
to one's own thesis however preposterous and use Him as a weapon
against others who are also His creatures.
It reminds me of Albert Camus's "duty to hesitate" in the face
of self-righteousness. It reminds me also of his "limits" to observe in
actions dictated by what individuals or groups consider to be absolute
truths. Indeed it is the blind faith in one's own truth that at one and
the same time leads to injustice and evokes terrorism as a response.
I invite all of you to exercise leadership in promoting greater
discernment in this regard. It can help shake old stereotypes and call
prejudice into question. It can in particular bring out the relevance of
Algeria's experience in combating terrorism to the challenges encoun-
tered today by the United States and the rest of the world.
Let us all remember that while there can be no liberty without
security if one attempts to sacrifice liberty for the sake of security one
is likely to end up with neither.
